This article provides sociological reflections on the use of research methods in the history of sport. In light of the convergence of social scientific approaches and social research methods in recent years, it draws upon Durkheim's reflections on the principles of sociology to explore the potential of the discipline to provide a distinctive methodological orientation to the study of sport. It subsequently uses this framework to assess the tendency in sports history to present interview data in non-anonymized form, and to advocate the value of particular kinds of comparative analysis for forwarding our understanding of the social world.
A formative moment in the development of sociology was the 1895 publication of Emile Durkheim's The Rules of Sociological Method. 1 For Durkheim, the discipline's viability depended upon the identification of a distinct object of study, requiring a distinct method of investigation. He embarked on a search for 'social facts' characterized by three criteria: externality (valid beyond individual humans); constraint (the consequence of living with other humans); and generality/independence (the behavioural similarities and differences between social groups and contexts). In so doing, Durkheim sought the study of observable, unconscious mental entities or 'collective representations' in order to deliver 'a conception of the world which as far as possible is not the view from anywhere within it'.
2 By this definition, sociological method must enable us to conceive of the social world at a relatively high level of generality.
The formation of sociology occurred relative to the pre-existing natural sciences and disciplines such as psychology, philosophy and history. A century later the context is very different. Sociology has become a fractured discipline with, for instance, many sociologists working in business schools, sports science and, increasingly, health departments. 9 Some perceive sociologists of sport to be facing a crisis due to specialization and scientization which has led to their positioning at the 'bottom of the epistemological hierarchy'. 10 Multidisciplinarity has been identified as a solution, and this movement has been aided by the widespread rejection of Durkheimian positivism, and its replacement with a stronger vein of interpretivism and qualitative methods. The use of interviewing in historical studies is to be welcomed for it contributes to the rejection of the somewhat false dichotomy of past and present which has divided sociology and history. 11 But if one compares the interview data that sociologists and historians present, a distinct difference is immediately apparent. Specifically, historians frequently directly attribute quotes to named individuals and have not adopted the conventions of anonymity and confidentiality. Why should this be?
There are ethical, practical but also broader conceptual implications of this practice. As outlined in the ethical guidelines of the British Sociological Association, the safeguarding of research subjects' privacy is fundamental. 12 The rationale for this is that if we can protect their identity, interviewees are more likely to honestly and fully divulge information. It therefore also has a strongly practical element to it -i.e. it improves the reliability and validity of data. Most would argue that there can and should be exceptions to preserving
anonymity, but those exceptions should be justified on a case-by-case basis and the practice should 'not … discarded lightly'. 13 Failing to offer interviewees the option of anonymity is problematic as it might restrict the kind and depth of information they are prepared to divulge.
Underpinning differences in presenting interview data are divergent conceptual views.
One reason for citing the names of interviewees seems to be the desire to give the individual's perspective a ring of authenticity -they were there, so they know. But providing names also seems to represent a continuation of the propensity in history to privilege accounts of individuals. In so doing, it needlessly focuses attention on relatively insignificant information, and concomitantly detracts from asking more expansive questions about social structure. We should not treat interview data as though it 'speaks for itself'. We 'cannot rely on naive readings of interview data … we must not take at face value insiders' explicit rationales for action'. 14 Rather (and I recognize that this runs counter to the recent popularity of auto-ethnography) the words of interviewees are of value because they are indicative of a broader body of (theory and) interview data. We need to subject interviewees' accounts to systematic and comparative analysis if we are to avoid reducing the social to the individual. Rather, I would argue that the production of more adequate knowledge about our social world requires cooperation across disciplines (and generations). As it is impossible for any individual to undertake all the primary data gathering required for the kind of 'complete systematization of experiences', cross-fertilization of studies is a necessity. Our goal should be the synthesis of understanding of higher and lower levels of generality and fundamental to this is the extensive use of comparison.
